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AN ENGLISH VIEW OF THE CIVIL WAR.

V.

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IN MY last article I dealt with the operations in the East, which are described in the third volume of *The Century's* papers on the Civil War. With a few further remarks on that subject, I shall pass on to consider the story of the campaigns in the West, which are also placed before the public in that volume.

The silence which was necessarily imposed upon General Burnside by loyalty to the Federal authorities has been, fortunately for us, broken through by Major Mason's highly irregular, but very interesting, personal invasion of General Burnside's headquarters. Very dramatic, certainly, is the scene described (page 101) where the Federal commander, after his terrible defeat, sitting "on an old log and being provided with crackers, cheese, sardines, and a bottle of brandy (all luxuries to a Confederate), discussed this lunch, as well as the situation," with the Confederate officer who had surreptitiously secured the interview with him.

It is very characteristic of that kind of West Point comradeship which was never wholly lost among the men who, on the two sides, were doing their best to kill one another, that Burnside should have been anxious to let the able soldiers opposed to him know, what he could not tell his own army, "that he was not responsible for the attack on Fredericksburg in the manner in which it was made, as he was himself under orders and was not much more than a figure-head."

Who, then, was responsible for this and for similar incidents? There exist in all professions certain men who make their way in the world by pandering to popular prejudices. In the army and the navy the form which this particular quality takes is one which is common in all countries, but in England and America it has

a special character of its own. During peace, the business of these men is to find excellent military reasons for the penny-wise economies which suit the taste of ministers who want to present a favorable budget to their countrymen. During war, their business is to clothe in military phraseology, and perhaps in army orders, the current popular prejudices of the time. Now, there is no wish to judge here of General Halleck's private character, or to say that, as a public servant, he may not have possessed many high qualities. But, taking the history of these campaigns from the time when he was appointed to the general command of the armies of the United States till the moment when, on "the coming of Grant," he was reduced to the position of a highly useful subordinate, I cannot trace the least evidence of his having ever given a decision which represented more than the embodied prejudices of the moment. There was a popular feeling that the mighty Army of the Potomac ought to brush from its path and easily destroy its numerically-inferior opponent; therefore the one thing said to be wanted was that it should go straight at its enemy and attack that enemy wherever found. Hence the orders from Washington for the disastrous attack on Fredericksburg, and hence the fatal persistence in that attack after all chance of surprising Lee, or of taking him at a disadvantage, had utterly disappeared.

When Lee began to move to his left after Chancellorsville, he offered General Hooker an obvious opportunity to overwhelm his right, which was still at Fredericksburg, and to threaten Richmond, long before any possible danger could have arisen to Washington with its powerful defences. But Lee was able to count with confidence upon the fears of a capital city and of the government within it for their own safety. The event proved that he was right. The mere suggestion by Hooker that to attack Lee's right was the proper course to pursue was sufficient to cause the removal of that general from his command. After Gettysburg, the popular impression appears to have been that the Confederate Army had been routed and that the Federal Army was virtually intact. The true state of the case was that the Confederate Army had certainly suffered very severely. It had been repulsed and defeated, but it was in no sense disorganized, and the Federal Army was in no condition for an effective general advance.

According to the evidence supplied by this volume, General Meade, at Gettysburg, appears to have done all that any one but a man of quite transcendent military genius could have done to organize an effective pursuit. Few soldiers can, therefore, read without some angry feeling the letter which Halleck then sent to Meade.

‘I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee’s army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore.’

That feeling must necessarily be increased by his further missive in answer to Meade’s natural and immediate reply, asking to be relieved from the command of the army. “My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee’s army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit.” Clearly General Halleck was in his wrong place. If, after Meade had won for the Federals the first great victory of the war over Lee’s army, it was advisable then and there to remove him, the first letter would have been a fitting preparatory step to that end. Otherwise, to say that it was not a censure, and yet send it, was an act of feebleness, and displayed great ignorance of how a general commanding an army in the field should be dealt with. What pursuit had Halleck carried out after Shiloh? Of all men in the war, Halleck was the last who ought to have reproached another man for not adequately reaping the fruits of victory. Jackson’s principle is always sound—never to “let up in pursuit” while pursuit is possible. But pursuit must have been begun in order to be followed up. An attack on the Confederates on the 4th July, if it had been possible for the Federal Army, would probably have been disastrous to the Confederates, because of their want of ammunition. No one who was not then present in the Federal Army can judge if it was possible. No one who was present at Gettysburg seems to have considered that it could be made. Under those circumstances, Halleck’s business, as the chief military adviser of the government, was clearly to have pointed out to the President, “It is impossible to judge without being on the spot whether it would have been possible to do more than Meade has done ; but as long as we retain him in command we must give him every sign of our confidence and all encouragement.” It would have been easy so to word an earnest belief in his future success as to suggest an eager pursuit.

It is not proposed to enter closely into what is called the "Meade-Sickles controversy." There are evidently exaggerations on both sides. General Meade, having only just succeeded to the command of the army before the battle of Gettysburg, was in a very difficult position. He seems to have used considerable judgment in the mode in which he brought up his reserves to the right place and at the right time. If he was unjust, as he is charged with being, in his report of the share of the different corps in the action, he only failed in what is an almost impossible task. No general can know for long after a battle all the details of what has happened in it. On the other hand, "councils of war" are recorded under Meade and other generals in this war as though they were the most natural and legitimate things in the world. It is difficult to conceive the circumstances under which such councils as are here described, and by means of which the general in command would seem to endeavor to transfer his own responsibility to the shoulders of the majority of the council's members, can be other than a blunder and a sign of weakness. Newspaper reports of wars have, I think, often tended to create very unfortunate popular impressions as to the frequency of these councils in all campaigns, which may even affect soldiers. Whenever a number of generals are known to be assembled at headquarters, those in search of news naturally jump to the conclusion that some event is about to take place, and announce to their readers that a "council of war" is being held. Nine times out of ten the generals have only been assembled to give such information as they possess, to state their views, and to receive their orders. The character of such a proceeding is altogether changed when it is announced as a deliberative "council of war"—the abomination of all strong men, a byword for inefficiency and want of decision, and for weakness of action in all military matters. The decision of Meade's "council of war" on the second day at Gettysburg, like that arrived at by most councils of war, was not to attack, and, therefore, as it fortunately proved, to remain where they were and accept battle. This decision cannot be taken as a model for future imitation, though it happened in this instance to be the right course, as it turned out.

On one point more there is a word to be said before we pass from the East to the West. The evidence appears to be clear that on the

afternoon of the first day of Gettysburg, at 4 o'clock, General Ewell had his corps, 20,000 strong, ready in column of attack to assault Culp's Hill. (Page 411.) The evidence is equally clear that, in all human probability, if that attack had then been delivered, it would have been successful, and that, if successful, the whole of Cemetery Ridge would have become untenable. Further, it is clear that Lee stopped that attack against Ewell's judgment. As the case arose, and as the facts were, there can be no question that this was an unfortunate decision. Lee was aware of the advance of Slocum's corps to the support of the Federals, and knew that his own army was not yet concentrated, but that, in all probability, it would be concentrated more effectively than the Federals could be by the following morning. This was the evidence before him at the time, and the reasoning to be inferred from it, under all the circumstances of the case, leads one to think that he was justified in postponing the attack as he did. If Lee had then known what we now know, it may be assumed that he would have attacked; but had we been in his position then, it is tolerably certain that most generals would have done as he did. It is not by the knowledge we now have of all the circumstances that such a decision as that of Lee must be judged, but by the knowledge of the facts which he himself then possessed. That this knowledge was not more accurate was, no doubt, due to the previous absence of Stuart and his cavalry. It was the only campaign of the war in which Lee fought blindfold, and he bitterly paid the penalty for so fighting. It would be rather interesting to know whether disappointment at losing the precious opportunity did or did not, during the following days, somewhat affect the vigor of Ewell's coöperation. Something of the usual energy of the Confederates seems to have been missing on that side, and though it may be attributed chiefly to the delay and the uncertainty of the hour of Longstreet's attack, other causes probably contributed, and this disappointment on Ewell's part was most likely among them.

There seems to be this general peculiarity about these campaigns in the West—that they were fought very much to secure recruiting districts. Where the condition of feeling was such that it made all the difference whether the district was in the occupation of the Federal or the Confederate troops, and whether the

State authorities were in sympathy with Washington or Richmond, it is obvious that the conditions are very unlike those which usually obtain in European warfare. The only very analogous wars to which one can go back for similar conditions in this respect are those of Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus. Gustavus, when he died, left to his successor several armies, though he had entered Germany with but one. It made all the difference that he had been able to clear the Protestant districts of the Imperial troops, and to establish recruiting depots there. It is obvious that the wisdom of military movements, and the relative importance of certain campaigns, cannot, under these circumstances, be judged on precisely the same principles on which one would judge contests between the different nations in Europe.

If the statements as to the condition of popular sentiment in California and in the West during the earlier years of the war, which are furnished us in some of these papers, are to be relied upon, it is evident that the so-called New Mexican campaign was a much more important matter, small as were the forces engaged in it, than it has been supposed to be. As General Grant has said, the Confederacy, without large territories to extend into, was doomed, even if it succeeded in establishing its independence. It looks as if, but for the judicious arrangements made by the Federal commander, the Confederate forces, after their successes at San Augustine Springs and Valverde, might have formed an imposing army in New Mexico and Texas. Such an army, if properly supported from Richmond, might have enabled the various Confederate sympathizers to make head in California, and to secure the all-important Pacific Coast, with its important gold supply. It is scarcely possible to overrate the difference which that would have made in the conditions of the war. Probably the Confederacy, cut off as it was from all the outside world by the original mistakes of Mr. Davis's administration, could not have afforded to furnish supplies for this New Mexico campaign. But considering the initial success which attended it, and that it failed almost entirely from lack of material resources, one is led to think it would have been worth a more serious effort.

The junction of Van Dorn and Price with General Beauregard's forces, after the battle of Shiloh and the retreat from Corinth, seems to show clearly how easy would have been that junction in the mode suggested in my first article, prior to the

Pea Ridge campaign and the battle of Shiloh. Then it would, in all probability, have been decisive as far as the battle of Shiloh itself was concerned, and at least for the year it would have left the whole West in the hands of the Confederacy. Considering the state of feeling prevailing at that time, it is impossible to gauge what might not have been the effect in the creation of new Southern forces. The retreat from Corinth seems to have been an extremely skilfully-contrived movement on the part of General Beauregard. General Halleck appears to have done about as little as it was possible for a man to do with the imposing forces and the able soldiers, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, who were with him. The regathering of the Confederate forces at Tupelo, and the scattering of the great Union Army, are among the most curious incidents of the war. General Beauregard had done great things for the army under his command during the halt at Corinth and Tupelo. Under his fostering care it had vastly improved both in discipline and in military training. It was a Confederate misfortune when ill-health obliged him to leave and hand over command to General Bragg. The whole of Bragg's ill-advised invasion of Kentucky and the simultaneous movements which led to the battles of Iuka and Corinth, in September and October, 1862, can, it seems, be only justly judged by taking into account the question of the recruiting districts. Bragg's advance into Kentucky was a mere flash in the pan, not because of any strategical or tactical considerations, in the ordinary sense of the term, but because Kentucky did not rise in support of the Confederate cause. Whatever may have been the reason,—whether the actual amount of anti-Union feeling in the State had been exaggerated, or because, as Bragg thought, the blue-grass region was too rich to allow men readily to sacrifice their wealth and ease for any cause,—the fact remains that Bragg's invasion was undertaken to gain recruiting districts; that is, in other words, to afford the people of Kentucky the chance of rising in support of Southern independence. The attempt was a failure; the people did not enlist even in sufficient numbers to make up the waste which the campaign itself entailed. It is, therefore, difficult to see how any change in the handling of troops could have made much difference in the final result. "The people have too many fat cattle and are too well off to fight," was General Bragg's commentary upon the conduct of the Kentuckians.

Van Dorn's movement on Corinth to make a direct attack upon it, instead of manœuvring Rosecrans out of it, was a mistake that seems obvious on the face of the facts. When Bragg had been intrusted with the chief command in the district, it was an enormous blunder on the part of the Confederate Government to place Price's forces under the command of Van Dorn. This arrangement, made without notice, suddenly deprived Bragg of the support upon which he had counted ; that is clear enough. It distinctly violated the principle so well expressed afterwards by President Lincoln, that it is not wise "to swap horses whilst you are crossing a stream." As far as one can now judge of the relations of time and place, there was not time, it would seem, for Price to have moved with considerable effect upon Nashville, as Bragg had ordered him to do. At all events, his long circuitous movement to join Van Dorn was a waste of force, even apart from the disastrous termination of that movement in the battle of Corinth (October 4, 1862). Buell's army was exposed to very serious risk in the movement from Nashville upon Louisville, and that risk would have been greatly increased if Price had moved as rapidly as possible upon Nashville. General Bragg was a commander who seems to have been very uncertain in his action. At times he was both skilful in his arrangements and enterprising in his movements. Suddenly his skill deserted him at the most critical moments. During his bold but useless invasion of Kentucky, he was, no doubt, right in considering that everything depended on a proper coöperation between him and General Kirby Smith. No doubt the authorities at Richmond were largely to blame for not definitely appointing one man to command the joint expedition from the moment the invasion of Kentucky had been determined upon. Nevertheless, from the evidence before us, it seems clear that Bragg was supplied with sufficient information as to Buell's move to have enabled him to fall upon Buell's flank during his march from Nashville to Louisville.

The decisive effect of such a move was so obvious that Bragg would clearly have been able to call upon General Smith to support him, and the junction of the two forces ought to have been made by Smith's junction with Bragg rather than by Bragg joining Smith. It is difficult to see how, if Bragg, supported as rapidly as possible by Smith, had fallen upon Buell during the march,—still more, if simultaneously, as Bragg wished, Price had

moved upon Nashville, instead of moving round to join Van Dorn at Corinth,—Nashville or Louisville could have escaped falling into the hands of the Confederate generals. Probably in that case they would have been able to strike back in time to intercept the retreat of the Union force from Cumberland Gap. If, as the Confederate writers seem to believe, the effect of so great a success would have been to induce Kentucky to throw itself heartily into the cause of the South, the result would have been most important. Without that, it is obvious that just as Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania caused numbers of the local militia to come to the aid of the Union forces, so the approach of Bragg's army to the borders of Ohio and Indiana tended to raise fresh armies against him. No doubt much of the relative ill-success, in proportion to numbers, which subsequently attended Buell's movement may be attributed to the rawness of that general's troops, who were little better than mere recruits, whilst Bragg's men had been trained to war in several campaigns. In the action of Perryville (October 8, 1862), which followed upon Buell's gradual concentration of force at Louisville, and the consequent retreat of Bragg, Buell evidently succeeded in imposing upon Bragg as to the direction in which he intended to move. Bragg's success in the fight and his successful retreat afterwards appear to have been very much the result of his possessing an army much better in hand and more experienced in fighting than it was possible for Buell to have collected under the circumstances at the time.

Though not prepared to modify the opinion expressed elsewhere, that General Lee was the most remarkable man the Civil War produced, and though I cannot admit that General Grant possessed at all the same genius for command, yet it must be at once confessed that it is an immense relief to turn from the mirage of these indecisive battles and movements in the West to the story of the Vicksburg campaign. It is very natural that General Sherman should rate very highly the military genius of General Grant, for the great services which, in the summer of 1863, Grant rendered to the Union made him tower head and shoulders over all others who could possibly be placed in supreme command of the Federal armies. McClellan had become by this time a political character, and as long as Mr. Lincoln remained President it was impossible that he should be again appointed Commander-in-Chief. The elections had already begun to show

the effect which the depression caused by Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville was producing throughout the North. Halleck, applying to a campaign which he could not stop till its success was assured the mischievous interference which had been in the East so fruitful in disaster, at last palpably stultified himself, even in the eyes of the President and the Cabinet. The scheme of the Vicksburg campaign was both original and brilliant in conception, and vigorous and fortunate in execution. Sherman, loyally anxious to acknowledge his own opposition to it, contributed, no doubt, largely to cause the military skill which Grant had shown to be appreciated throughout the country.

In its general character of sudden movement, by which he enlisted on the side of his army the advantages of surprise by a concentrated force, unentangled by any line of supplies, the Vicksburg campaign closely resembles many of Jackson's operations. It had something of the character of his campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and something that recalled his movements which preceded the second Bull Run. The news of such strokes as Grant delivered in rapid succession at Port Gibson, South Fork, Fourteen-Mile Creek, Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Big Black River, coming at a moment when gold had gone up to a figure hitherto unknown, and in the very weeks which immediately succeeded Chancellorsville and preceded Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, must, indeed, have seemed like a sudden break of light through the darkest of clouds. No wonder, therefore, that public attention became concentrated on the siege of Vicksburg. The very fact that six weeks elapsed before the surrender was probably in favor of Grant's reputation. It gave time for representative people from the North to gather in the besieger's lines, and hear from the victorious army all the particulars about the successful campaign, and to learn how entirely it depended for its conception and execution upon the skill of one man, and upon the confidence which he had inspired in his subordinates.

When, almost at the same moment, the fall of Vicksburg and the battle of Gettysburg made the 4th of July, 1863, almost a new birthday for the Union, the general self-congratulation of the North made all hearts crave for a hero—for some one in whom to feel confidence. All this tended greatly, and very naturally, to increase the importance of Grant's position. In the West, the work accomplished and the victories achieved were palpably

Grant's own, but from the first the general public, at least, seem to have refused to Meade the honors of the battle which had been won under his orders. When, in consequence of the defeat at Chickamauga, the virtual investment of Rosecrans's army in Chattanooga, and the unhappy condition of Burnside's army at Knoxville, the aspect of affairs in the West again became gloomy and threatening, it followed as a matter of course that General Grant should be intrusted with the task of restoring the Union affairs in the West.

General Bragg seems to have shown, in the campaigns which had intervened since his retreat from Kentucky, a strange mixture of qualities. At the battle of Stone's River he successfully planned and carried out an attack upon the right flank of Rosecrans's army. But when everything was going in his favor, he abandoned his advantage, and, instead of crushing in the defeated wing upon the other wing, made a gratuitous attack upon the strongest intact position left to the enemy, and at a point where his previous success gave him no advantage. Rosecrans skilfully manœuvred Bragg out of his defensive positions, and forced him back beyond Chattanooga in June and July, 1863. The art of finding out the position, movements, and intentions of the enemy is the A B C of generalship. Of this art General Bragg was not only ignorant, but he lacked even the power to put together into one intelligible whole the information daily supplied by his outposts and obtained from other sources. At Chickamauga the victory was clearly in no way due to Bragg, and his incapacity to realize the nature of the situation presented to him was very much alike at the two battles of Stone's River and Chickamauga. He seems in the first instance to have contrived with considerable skill the virtual investment of Rosecrans in Chattanooga, but it is difficult to understand why, if his force was sufficient to allow him to detach Longstreet at all, he should not have attacked Bridgeport before the arrival of Hooker's troops. To have done so would have deprived the Union troops of their only means of constructing boats within reach of the beleaguered army. Bragg seems to have relapsed into a condition of careless confidence after the important positions round Chattanooga had been, in the first instance, secured. So much so that things were left in a condition which only required that a vigorous leader should restore confidence to the army of the Union to make it certain that

the besiegers would lose all the results of their previous successes.

So far as one may judge from the papers contributed to this series, those who fought under Grant at Chattanooga are by no means disposed to credit him with any great share in the work of opening the "cracker line," or even in planning the battle itself. I am disposed to think that they hardly do General Grant justice. It may be very true that the apparently splendid effect which, as the broad results only were heard of at a distance, appeared to attend the placing of Grant in command of the army and the dismissal of Rosecrans, was something of a *coup de théâtre*. It may be very true that the arrangements for opening communications had been at least partly planned under Rosecrans before Grant's arrival at Chattanooga, on the 23d October, 1863, and that they were mainly the work of subordinates. It may be true that, in the actual moment of victory at that place, the successful charge of Thomas was due to the spontaneous enthusiasm of the men, and that it was actually carried out in excess of Grant's intention or order. If it be assumed that Grant trusted entirely for his success to Sherman's attack upon the Confederate right, or trusted for success even to the combined effect of Sherman's and of Hooker's movement, it is no doubt true that Grant's original plan was not carried out. Grant certainly made many changes in his plans of attack, but surely this sort of criticism is not by any means fair to a general commanding an army in battle! The changes of plans seem to have been only such as the changing circumstances rendered necessary. General Grant acknowledges that Rosecrans offered him many most valuable suggestions, and rather pithily says: "My only surprise was that he had not carried them out." This may or may not be quite fair to Rosecrans, and it may be the case that the arrangements were being worked out as rapidly as circumstances admitted before Grant's arrival. But, taking the whole of the facts as they stand, it seems clear that while Grant, as any sensible man in his case would have done, took advantage of whatever had been effected before his arrival that promised to be useful, and listened to all suggestions that were likely to assist in the solution of a very difficult problem, nevertheless it was his energy and skill which carried the whole of the scheme through the great victory of Chattanooga. No doubt, as continually occurs in war, things did not happen exactly in the way he had designed they should

happen, but he was ready to do the best thing that was to be done under all the fresh circumstances as they arose. The actual working-out, the general superintendence of the whole scheme, were his and his alone.

The panic which appears at the last in that battle to have seized upon a portion of the Confederate Army was not, I think, the improbable event General Bragg seems to have considered it. Nothing tells so much on the confidence and courage of an army as the conviction that their general has been outmanœuvred by the enemy. Now, his army, it seems, never had any very special confidence in Bragg, and every misfortune is possible to the army that has no confidence in its leader. The battle of Chickamauga, and the knowledge that he had actually absented himself from the field under the belief that the battle was lost, must have greatly diminished their faith in him, even in the moment of victory. Then, after their successful investment of the Union army in Chattanooga, with everything to raise their spirits and depress those of their opponents, there came upon them one blow after another; first, the opening of the "cracker line," which meant, as they well knew, that there was no longer any hope of seeing the Federal Army surrender from want of food and ammunition; then the successive reënforcements of the Federals, the arrival of Hooker and of Sherman, the most unwise withdrawal of Longstreet's force, and of the detachments sent afterwards to reënforce him, just before Grant was ready to attack. Then came the successful ruse and surprise by which Thomas carried the outposts and picket-lines of the besiegers, and took up a threatening position all along the front of their works; then General Hooker, by the successful employment of superior forces against a weak part of the Confederate line, necessitated the withdrawal of their troops from Lookout Mountain; and then came Sherman's successful surprise of their pickets on the right, by means of which he contrived to get his troops across the river without loss, and to establish them, unknown to his enemy, on their right flank.

I think one may well guess what must have been the effect of all these Federal operations upon the minds of the Confederate soldiers. It is quite true that little material advantage was actually gained by Grant by his attack on the Chattanooga position. But each succeeding event tended to depress the spirits of the

Confederate Army, to shake their confidence in their leaders, whilst, on the other hand, every fresh move of Grant's tended to restore confidence to the Federal troops, and to make them believe they were being skilfully led. There is a sense in which, with armies as with individuals, deep depression, when once relieved, tends to pass rapidly into a condition of high exaltation, all the more effective because of the reaction from the previous opposite feeling. The army under the command of General Thomas, after all the misery and starvation they had courageously endured, seem to have passed through these phases. Nothing could have been better calculated to excite in them an extreme and passionate desire to go through any sacrifice for victory than that they should be kept for some time idly waiting in front of the enemy, whose forward position they had already seized, and compelled to witness the fighting being done for them by the armies that had come to relieve them—by Sherman on their left, and by Hooker on their right.

Those are circumstances under which you may securely trust Anglo-Saxon troops, at least when once released from the leash, to go forward, as those of General Thomas did, with a bound that carries everything before it, and that probably exceeds both your wishes and your orders. The apparently-sudden change in temperament of their opponents seems to have been all that was needed to convert the discouragement of the Southerners into actual flight. Grant certainly deserves all possible credit for having, within the time between his arrival and the battle of Chattanooga, done so much thus to change the condition of the *morale* of his own army, and of that which was opposed to it. He further deserves the credit of having realized how important that change was to him, and how advantage could best be taken of it. The story told in these papers is a fitting introduction to the time when Grant was to be transferred to a yet higher command, and to be pitted against very different opponents from Generals Bragg and Pemberton.

It is rather curious that this third volume on the Civil War should close with an account of Longstreet's first independent command, in which, far from remaining perpetually on the defensive, he committed himself to the particularly bloody attack upon Knoxville, which, ill-prepared and ill-advised, ended in failure.

WOLSELEY.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]